Implications of loan portfolio concentration in Cambodia by Leon, Florian
   
 
 
 
Volume 37, Issue 1
 
Implications of loan portfolio concentration in Cambodia
 
Florian Leon 
University of Luxembourg, CREA
Abstract
This paper explores how the composition of banks' loan portfolios affect banks operating in Cambodia. The
implications of loan portfolio concentration has begun to attract attention in recent years. However, existing studies
remain focus on developed or emerging countries because data in other developing countries are lacking. In this paper,
we fill this gap by investigating the effects of loan portfolio concentration on Cambodian banks' return. We find that
sectoral diversification is positively related to banks' returns. In addition, foreign banks and commercial banks are less
affected by loan concentration than their counterparts.
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1 Introduction
Whether lending specialization hurts or improves banks’ return and risk is in itself a much
debated question in the economic literature and in policy circles. A recent literature has
investigated this issue in the case of industrialized (Acharya et al., 2006; Hayden et al.,
2007) and emerging countries such as China (Berger et al., 2010) or Brazil (Tabak et al.,
2011). In spite of its importance, there is little evidence for other developing countries
due to the lack of data. In this paper, I begin to fill this gap by investigating whether
diversification induces poorer performance for banks in Cambodia.
The traditional banking theory argues that banks should be as diversified as possible.
Less diversified bank would be more vulnerable to economic downturns, since they expose
themselves to few sectors. Furthermore, several models of intermediation theory suggests
that diversification makes it cheaper for lenders to achieve credibility in their role as
screeners and monitors of borrowers (Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986).
However, the corporate finance theory argues that firms should concentrate their
activity on a specific sector to take benefits of expertise in how business are done in these
sectors (Jensen, 1986; Denis et al., 1997). Focused banks will gain expertise in the sectors
they lend to, and hence can detect a deterioration of the borrower’s business earlier and
may react in a timely manner by risk mitigation. According to this view we expect that
performance increases with concentration.
The empirical literature on diversification versus concentration is heavily concentrated
on US and European markets. Few papers have investigated this issue for emerging coun-
tries with mixed results. Several articles document that sectoral diversification reduces
the performances of the banks and/or increases the risk of defaults in normal times as
in China (Berger et al., 2010) or in Brazil (Tabak et al., 2011). However, Bebczuk and
Galindo (2008) document that diversified Argentine banks suffer less than their counter-
parts during the 2001-2002 Argentine financial crisis. Atahau and Cronje (2015) doc-
ument that loan concentration has a negative effect, albeit non-significant, on perfor-
mance of government-owned banks in Indonesia. Using a cross-country study, Beck and
De Jonghe (2013) find results in line with the traditional view; sectoral diversification is
negatively related to bank risk, while not being associated with higher returns. However,
their results holds mainly for developed economies. Despite their interesting results, these
studies provide tiny lights for developing countries because Argentina, China or Brazil
are very specific and differ from other developing countries in some aspects.
In this paper, I test whether loan concentration is beneficial for banks in Cambodia.
Cambodia is a rapid growth developing countries that did not experience a crisis in the
past decade (normal times). The Cambodian banking system has witnessed a rapid de-
velopment in the past decade; the number of banks operating in the country has risen
from 20 in 2006 to 47 in 2015 and assets managed by the banking system have been
multiplied by more than ten. In spite of these improvements, financial access remains
limited in Cambodia. Investigating the determinants of performance of financial system
is of prime importance in Cambodia to pursue rapid growth. In doing so, I follow method-
ology employed in recent studies (Acharya et al., 2006; Hayden et al., 2007; Tabak et al.,
2011).
Results document that loan portfolio concentration decreases returns, in line with
the traditional banking theory.1 This finding is particularly interesting. Previous papers
provide evidence that diversification can be helpful during crisis period (Bebczuk and
Galindo, 2008) but not during normal times (Berger et al., 2010; Tabak et al., 2011) for
emerging countries. This work challenges this view and points out that loan concentration
can be also detrimental during normal times, at least in Cambodia. This study also shows
that the detrimental impact of loan concentration is mitigated for foreign-owned banks.
Section 2 presents the methodology, Section 3 sums up the main findings and the final
section concludes.
1In a first version, I also investigated the impact of loan concentration on loan quality (NPLs to
loans). Findings suggest that loan concentration does not impact loan quality. However, econometric
results were subject to caution (lack of explanatory power and significance for all variables) and results
are not reported here.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
For each bank operating in Cambodia, the Central bank provides the individual bank-
level data, as well as loans outstanding by economic sectors for each bank. The sample
consists of an unbalanced panel data of 57 banks operating between 2006 to 2015.2 To
avoid a survivorship bias, all banks operating in any point of time are present in the
database, even if they cease to exist or merge at any point of the period considered.
2.2 Concentration measures
The main variable of interest is sectoral concentration. Loans are classified into 9 cate-
gories: Agriculture, manufacturing, trade, construction, real-estate and utilities, financial
intermediation, other services, personal consumption and other.3 I firstly defined the rel-
ative exposure of the bank i at time t to each sector j as follows:
sjit =
Loansjit∑9
j=1 Loansjit
(1)
Based on relative exposures, I consider the Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) as a
proxy of concentration. The HHI of bank i at time t is given as:
HHIit =
J∑
j=1
s2jit (2)
As a robustness check, I also compute the Euclidian distance measure to quantify the
divergence between a bank sectoral pattern and the benchmark loan portfolio. In this
case, the industry composition of the economy’s loan market portfolio is a benchmark for
diversification. The Euclidian distance is computed as:
EDit =
√√√√
J∑
j=1
(sjit − s¯jt)2 (3)
2Date are available at: http://www.nbc.org.kh/english/economic_research/banks_reports.php
3Classification provided by the Cambodian Central Bank has changed from 2006 to 2015. From 2006
to 2008, loans are classified in 11 categories and in 16 categories between 2009 and 2015. I provide a
comprehensive classification that overlaps both classifications (for more details, see the Appendix)
where s¯jt = 1/I
∑I
i sjit. Both measures of concentration increase with the level of con-
centration. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows that loan portfolio concentration has been
reduced over time and both measures provide close information.
2.3 Econometric model
I follow methodology employed in previous studies (Acharya et al., 2006; Hayden et al.,
2007). The regression framework consists on a panel regression of the performance of
bank i in period t on the sectoral diversification measure (SDIV) calculated from the
bank’s portfolio in the same period and a set of control variables; so that the regression
equation is:
Yit = α + βSDIVit +
N∑
n
γnXnit + νt + µi + εit (4)
where Y is a measure of return (return on assets, RoA). Two measures of sectoral diver-
sification/concentration are considered (SDIV), namely the Hirshmann-Herfindahl Index
(HHI) and the Euclidian distance (ED). The set of control variables includes three fre-
quently used variables, namely the logarithm of total assets capturing the size of the
bank (SIZE), the equity ratio defined as the ratio of equity to total assets (EQ RATIO),
the overhead costs to total assets (COST).4 In addition, one might expect that sectoral
diversification can be related to geographical and income diversification (complementary
or substitution). To take into account this possibility, I include two additional control
variables: an index for income diversification defined as the ratio of non-interest income
to total income (INC DIV); and, a measure of geographical diversification computed as
the share of bank branches outside Phnom Penh (GEO DIV). Finally, since I use the two-
way fixed-effects panel estimator, I add bank-individual dummies (µi) and time dummies
(νt). The individual dummies control for all characteristics which differ between banks,
such as different ownership structures.
It is worth noting that the level of performance may present inertia across time and
4The Size variable is included due to potential omitted bias because large banks can reap scale
economies but are also more diversified by nature. Equity ratio is often included to control for risk
aversion (Maudos and De Guevara, 2004) that could impact bank strategy and therefore their revenues.
Finally, the cost variable takes into account differences in efficiency.
therefore dynamic panel data model can be best suited. In this case, I extend the Eq. 5 by
adding the lagged dependent variable. In order to control for such endogeneity bias, the
difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the system-GMM estimator
(Blundell and Bond, 1998) are employed.5 It should be noted that results from Difference-
GMM are presented for sake of brevity. Indeed, the GMM Difference potentially suffer
from an issue of weak instruments, especially when variables are strongly persistent over
time (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999). Variables in level
are poor instruments of variables in difference. Insofar as loan concentration is highly
persistent over time, we doubt on the reliability of Difference-GMM to provide unbiased
results.
Tabak et al. (2011) point out that the impact of loan concentration is partially con-
ditional to bank ownership structure. I therefore investigate whether the effect of loan
concentration differs by type of banks or ownership structure. The Cambodian banking
system is dominated by commercial banks that account for more than 98% of total assets;
a share that is similar than that observed ten years ago. A large number of (commercial
and specialized) banks are owned by foreigners. In 2015, 37 banks could be classified as
foreign-owned banks (foreign capital represents at least 50% of total capital) and foreign
banks managed 55% of total assets. If we compare with data for 2006, we observe an
increase of the share of foreign-owned banks; in 2006, foreign banks represented only 9
banks to 20 and managed less than half of total assets (48%). Data on financial sys-
tems by type and ownership are provided in the Appendix (Table A2). In addition, we
show that loan concentration (HHI and ED) does not really differ according to bank type
and ownership (see Figures A2 and A3). Nonetheless, to study whether bank type or
ownership matters, I add an interaction between SDIV (HHI or ED) with a dummy for
foreign-owned banks or for commercial banks as follows:
Yit = α + β1SDIVit ++β2SDIVit ∗Di +
N∑
n
γnXnit + µi + νt + εit (5)
5The lagged endogenous variable and other explanatory variables are considered as predetermined
(changing the set of lags to instruments variables does not affect results). In order to ascertain the
validity of the instrument set, several usual specification tests are implemented (Arellano-Bond tests for
serial correlation and overidentification test).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics Correlations
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max ROA HHI ED SIZE EQ COST INCD GEOD
RoA 338 0.0122 0.0408 -0.3742 0.1055 1
HHI 338 0.3703 0.2133 0.1379 1 -0.24 1
ED 338 0.4013 0.2192 0.0762 0.9786 -0.24 0.9100 1
SIZE 338 12.818 1.5522 8.6395 16.561 0.27 -0.34 -0.42 1
EQ 338 0.4202 0.2932 0.0481 1 -0.18 0.24 0.32 -0.84 1
COST 338 0.0417 0.0354 0.0044 0.3655 -0.64 0.10 0.08 -0.32 0.23 1
INC DIV 338 0.1829 0.1466 0 0.7209 0.01 0.24 0.18 0.10 -0.22 0.02 1
GEO DIV 338 0.2513 0.2881 0 0.9575 0.19 -0.13 -0.21 0.46 -0.43 0.07 0.23 1
where Di is a dummy taken value one if more than 50% of capital is owned by non-
Cambodian investors and 0 otherwise or a dummy taken value one for commercial banks
and 0 for specialized banks.
3 Results
3.1 Baseline results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics as well as correlations. The level of concentration
is negatively correlated with performance, in line with the traditional banking theory.
To confirm results from simple descriptive statistics, I run static and dynamic models
presented above.
Table 2 presents the results of the relationship between Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index
(HHI) and Return on Assets (RoA). I present results using simple pooled OLS (column
[1]), random-effect model (column [2]), within estimator (column [3]), the difference-GMM
estimator (column [4]), and the System-GMM estimator (column [5]). There is a strong
evidence of a negative relationship between costs and return: higher overheads costs
deteriorate performance. In addition, there is evidence of a positive relationship between
geographical diversification and return. Other control variables do not seem to affect
performance. In particular, the lagged value of dependent variable is not statistically
significant, indicating a limited inertia in returns on assets.
Regarding the interest variable, in all cases, the coefficient associated with HHI is
negative and significant in 4 out of 5 specifications. As explained above, results from
GMM-Diff suffer from a weak instrumentation issue because loan concentration is highly
persistent over time. The relationship between loan concentration and banks’ performance
is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. An one-standard devi-
ation of loan concentration induce a decrease of RoA by 1.00% that is far from anecdotal
insofar as mean of RoA equals 1.22%.
To confirm this result, I change the interest variable by using the Euclidian Distance
instead of HHI. Econometric results, displayed in Table 3, are largely unchanged both
statically and economically. This finding indicates that diversification appears to be more
Table 2: Relationship between Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and bank’s return
Dependent variable: Return on assets
OLS RE FE GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
HHI -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.027 -0.048**
(-3.25) (-3.38) (-2.85) (-0.98) (-2.41)
RoA (t-1) 0.020 0.104
(0.24) (1.33)
SIZE 0.000 0.004 0.018*** 0.003 0.001
(0.04) (1.17) (3.06) (0.17) (0.15)
EQ 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.052 0.018
(1.42) (1.07) (1.17) (1.20) (0.62)
COST -0.770*** -0.674*** -0.561*** 0.808*** -0.946***
(-5.76) (-3.51) (-2.76) (-2.83) (-7.37)
INC DIV 0.010 0.020 0.040* 0.043 0.054**
(0.63) (1.16) (1.96) (1.39) (2.09)
GEO DIV 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.050** 0.036**
(4.41) (3.56) (3.54) (2.39) (1.64)
Dummies
- Bank No No Yes Yes Yes
- Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs 338 338 338 217 275
# bank 57 57 57 44 52
R2 0.51 0.48 0.32
- F-test 3.9*** 5.0***
- Wald test 50.9*** 56.4*** 168.1***
- Hansen test (p-value) 0.910 0.963
- m1 (p-value) 0.157 0.158
- m2 (p-value) 0.276 0.305
# instruments 63 71
Dependent variable is the return on assets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively. OLS refers to Ordinary Least Squares estimator, RE to random-effect model, FE to fixed
effect model (within estimator), Diff-GMM to difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), and
Sys-GMM to system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In column [3], we report the R2 within. The
Hansen test is test of overidentification restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, instruments are exoge-
nous. m1 (resp,. m2) are Arellano-Bond tests for first (second)-order serial correlation, asymptotically
N(0, 1). These test the first-differenced residuals in the system GMM estimators. Standards are clustered
for fixed effect models and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction is used for Difference GMM
and Sytem GMM models.
advantageous than concentration. This result gives support to the traditional banking
theory. However, contrary to Bebczuk and Galindo (2008) that also give support to this
view, Cambodia did not experience a crisis during this period. In other words, this result
shows that the traditional banking theory can be also valid even in normal times, while
existing papers reject this hypothesis (Berger et al., 2010; Tabak et al., 2011).
I run a battery of robustness checks to be sure that results are not driven by spurious
correlation.6 First, I use lagged values of all independent variables (HHI, ED and control
6For sake of brevity, tables are not presented but are available upon request.
Table 3: Relationship between Euclidian Distance (ED) and bank’s return
Dependent variable: Return on assets
OLS RE FE GMM-Diff GMM-Sys
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
ED -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.032** 0.009 -0.032*
(-4.14) (-3.22) (-2.29) (0.25) (-1.72)
RoA (t-1) 0.066 0.126
(0.79) (1.54)
SIZE -0.000 0.003 0.015** -0.013 0.001
(-0.17) (0.82) (2.46) (-1.04) (0.19)
EQ 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.040 0.022
(1.45) (1.13) (1.05) (1.17) (1.05)
COST -0.782*** -0.695*** -0.564*** -0.934*** -0.982***
(-5.92) (-3.58) (-2.71) (-5.15) (-9.79)
INC DIV 0.008 0.019 0.039* 0.069** 0.043*
(0.56) (1.09) (1.74) (1.96) (1.76)
GEO DIV 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.040**
(4.31) (3.65) (3.64) (2.96) (2.27)
Dummies
- Bank No No Yes Yes Yes
- Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs 338 338 338 217 275
# bank 57 57 57 44 52
R2 0.51 0.49 0.29
- F-test 4.4*** 5.4***
- Wald test 58.7*** 112.0*** 212.0***
- Hansen test (p-value) 0.941 0.981
- m1 (p-value) 0.157 0.144
- m2 (p-value) 0.244 0.257
# instruments 63 71
Dependent variable is the return on assets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively. OLS refers to Ordinary Least Squares estimator, RE to random-effect model, FE to fixed
effect model (within estimator), Diff-GMM to difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), and
Sys-GMM to system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In column [3], we report the R2 within. The
Hansen test is test of overidentification restrictions. Under the null hypothesis, instruments are exoge-
nous. m1 (resp,. m2) are Arellano-Bond tests for first (second)-order serial correlation, asymptotically
N(0, 1). These test the first-differenced residuals in the system GMM estimators. Standards are clustered
for fixed effect models and the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction is used for Difference GMM
and Sytem GMM models.
variables) instead of contemporaneous values because contemporaneous values might lead
to bias estimation due to reverse causation. Econometric results are insensitive to this
change. Second, I change econometric specification by adding control variable one by one.
Results point out that coefficient associated with HHI remains negative and statistically
significant in all specifications. Coefficients associated with distance are always negative
but only significant when COST variable is included. Finally, I change the sample by
excluding outliers (defined as observations for which dependent variable is below the 5
percentile or above the 95 percentile). The econometric results are confirmed.
3.2 Distinction by type and ownership structure
As stated above, banks operating in Cambodia can be divided between commercial and
specialized banks and between foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks. I then study
whether the impact of loan concentration on performance differs between specialized and
commercial banks and between domestic-owned and foreign-owned banks. Results are
displayed in Table 4. I firstly test the interaction between the types of banks (special-
ized banks vs. commercial banks) in columns [1] (using HHI) and [2] (using ED). We
observe that the negative impact of loan concentration on performance is exacerbated for
specialized banks.
Table 4: Distinction by type and ownership structure
Type of banks Structure ownership
[1] [2] [3] [4]
SDIV -0.199*** -0.181*** -0.068* -0.076**
(-2.97) (-2.72) (-1.94) (-2.22)
SDIV*Dummy 0.197*** 0.171** 0.052* 0.060*
(3.00) (2.56) (1.79) (1.95)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs 338 338 338 338
# bank 57 57 57 57
R2 (within) 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.18
Dependent variable are the return on assets . *, ** and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Within estimator is used. Standards are
clustered at the bank level. SDIV is the Herfindahl index in columns [1] and [3]
and the Euclidian distance in columns [2] and [4]. Dummy is a dummy taken
value one for commercial banks and 0 for specialized banks in columns [1] and [2]
and a dummy equals to one for foreign banks (more than 50% of capital is owned
by foreigners) and 0 for domestic-owned banks in columns [3] and [4]. The list
of control variables included: log(Assets), equity ratio, overhead costs to total
assets, income diversification index and geographical diversification index.
In a second step, I follow Tabak et al. (2011) and study whether bank ownership
matters. Results in columns [3] and [4] indicate that foreign banks seems to be less
affected by the negative impact of concentration on performance. While the net effect of
loan concentration remains negative, its impact is reduced for foreign-owned banks.
4 Conclusion
This paper is the first to empirically investigate the implications of lending concentration
on banks operating in a low-income country. Using a sample of 57 Cambodian banks
from 2006 to 2015 (338 observations), I show that diversification improves bank’s per-
formance. These results partially confirm the traditional banking theory and contradict
evidence from emerging countries, highlighting the specificity of developing countries.
Further research should investigate in details why loan concentration is beneficial in some
circumstances and not in others. Interacting country characteristics and economic situa-
tion (normal times and crisis times) may be a promising avenue to solve this puzzle.
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Appendix A Additional table and figure
Table A1: Classification by sectors
This paper 2006-2008 2009-2015
Agriculture Agriculture Agrigulture
Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
Trade Wholesale and retail
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Construction Construction Construction
Real-estate and utilities Real-estate and utilities
Real-estate
Utilities
Services Services
Hotels and restaurants
Transport and storage
Information media & Telecom
Other non-financial services
Financial intermediation Bank and finance
Financial institutions
Leasing activities
Personal consumption Personal consumption Personal consumption
Others
Other Other lending
Export Mining and Quarrying
Import
Figure A1: Evolution of loan portfolio concentration
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Table A2: Financial system, summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All financial institutions
Total assets 338 1060669 1863904 5650 155577246
Total equity 338 204283 297495 4991 2631719
Total loans 338 588774 1149915 126 10004111
Profit (before tax) 338 24362 61082 -14967 541021
Nb. Branches 338 12.40 38.78 1 258
Commercial banks
Total assets 269 1314116 2012773 55778 155577246
Total equity 269 245388 320472 34306 2631719
Total loans 269 726746 1252312 1295 10004111
Profit (before tax) 269 30227 67237 -14967 541021
Nb. Branches 269 15.20 43.04 1 258
Specialized banks (n=69)
Total assets 69 72592 77092 5650 382474
Total equity 69 44036 33225 4991 215566
Total loans 69 50885 58388 126 252379
Profit (before tax) 69 1495 2522 -7793 9409
Nb. Branches 69 1.48 1.28 1 6
Domestic banks
Total assets 234 836112 1145578 5650 6041550
Total equity 234 174730 187206 4991 1451311
Total loans 234 435264 645303 390 388532
Profit (before tax) 234 15150 32425 -14967 237112
Nb. Branches 234 5.48 6.31 1 33
Foreign banks
Total assets 104 1565923 2832986 9986 155577246
Total equity 104 270778 451487 9946 2631719
Total loans 104 934172 1791756 126 10004111
Profit (before tax) 104 45088 95929 -12176 541021
Nb. Branches 104 27.98 66.91 1 258
Data are in millions KHR (except the number of branches), 1USD = 4,050 KHR
Figure A2: Loan portfolio concentration, by type
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Figure A3: Loan portfolio concentration, by ownership
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